Climate Policy and Multi-Level Citizenship

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Structure

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Introduction/Summary

Facing the existential challenge of climate change, climate policy analysis is usually considered to be an addressed science (with the prospect of establishing a trans-disciplinary research agenda). In doing so, it should be taken into account that any scientific discipline can use and unfold its capacities only based on theory - reaching from reflected terms and typologies to sets of explanative hypotheses. At it, the quality of theory (its empirical content) co-varies with its scope of validity and its preciseness.[1]

According to this scientific theory orientation, I present some ideas on how I think climate policy analysis can be systematized and advanced. The first part of the presentation relates to problem and policy profiles out of the criterions intensity, scope, depth, and velocity.[2] After having illustrated these profiles by some aspects of current climate change and climate policy, I present a typology of socio-ecological structures - leading to some suggestions. Then the framing of multi-level citizenship and its counter-framing are outlined - focusing on multi-level versus one-level thinking, one-dimensional versus multi-dimensional politics, and the concept of multi-level citizenship. Some hypotheses on the rise and decline of multi-level citizenship follow - resulting in some ideas to a research program on climate policy and multi-level citizenship.

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[1] Karl R. Popper 1934: Logik der Forschung, (3. Edition, Tübingen: Siebeck 1969), p. 85.; see also: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logik_der_Forschung. Under the aspect of empirical content, science stands out by its striving at theory-building towards quality journalism and other service-areas of knowledge-production. Volker von Prittwitz 2016: What is Science? http://diberlin.info/index_htm_files/PA%201%20What%20is%20Science.pdf

[2] The main ideas to the categories go back to: Volker von Prittwitz 1990: Das Katastrophenparadox. Elemente einer Theorie der Umweltpolitik, Opladen: Leske + Budrich, pp. 54-62.

1. Problem and policy profiles

Both climate change and climate policy can be systematically analyzed according to the criterions of intensity, scope, depth and velocity. By systematically combining these criterions, problem and policy profiles can be formed.

1.1 Intensity

The international climate policy discussions circle around the questions how successful the hitherto made efforts of reducing GHGs have been and how intensely greenhouse gas emissions have to be reduced in order to avoid existential climate risks for humanity. A current example of that way of discussion is given in Carbon Brief (15 November 2016).[3] The online service presents the following charts:

Figure 1: *Selected CO2 Charts 1960-2020*

Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industry since 1960 (top left); global emissions by fuel type (middle left); Territorial (solid) and consumption (dashed) emissions by country group (bottom left); territorial emissions from biggest emitters (top right); per capita emissions from biggest emitters (bottom right). Source: Le Quéré, C. et al. (2016); February 21, 2017, taken out: https://www.carbonbrief.org/what-global-co2-emissions-2016-mean-climate-change

Then Carbon Brief states: *The new analysis finds global fossil fuel emissions grew by 0.7% in 2014, then held steady in 2015. Provisional data for 2016 predict a very small rise, of just 0.2%. This is a notable slowdown in emission growth, compared to an average rate of 3.5% in the 2000s and 1.8% over the most recent decade, 2006-2015. You can see this in the top left panel below… But as long as we're emitting CO2, it continues to build up in the atmosphere – and it is doing so at record levels. …, 2016 will be the first full year in which atmospheric CO2 concentration stays above the 400 ppm milestone. Rising concentrations mean rising temperatures. The WMO has confirmed that 2011-2015 was the hottest five-year period on record and it expects 2016 to be the hotter, beating 2015 into second place with a global average temperature of 1.2C above the long-term average. This will mean 16 of the 17 warmest years on record will have been since 2000.*

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[3] https://www.carbonbrief.org/what-global-co2-emissions-2016-mean-climate-change

The global CO2 emissions have been quite stable during the last three years - no reason for give the all-clear; in the contrary, the meanwhile reached GHG load in the atmosphere is higher than ever; no wonder that we are experiencing the hottest six-year-period ever (from 2010 - 2016) and the oxygen content of the oceans has dramatically decreased.[4] That is, the intensity of climate protection efforts has to be furtherly intensified in order to reduce the risk of fatal climate change.

Systematically, the degree of emissions or any other aftermath of it can be considered an expression of problem intensity - ranging between 0% and 100% of a thinkable climate disaster. The intensity of steering, at its part, can be defined as the degree of steering in order to avoid a climate disaster (between 0% and 100%.

1.2 Scope

Both emissions and related environmental action take place in certain scopes of space, time, and facts. That's why scopes of space, time, and facts can be systematically differentiated.

The practical significance of these criterions is often overlooked:

- While the development of CO2 emissions has meanwhile (before Trump's government) come into a stable phase at a high level, the emissions of other - even more hazardous - pollutants such as Methane increase even more.[5]
- The international community has to cope with the problem of *closing one door - opening two others*. As long as the scope of climate protection efforts is not comprehensive enough, relative success in one field of protection is over-compensated through new environmentally hazardous activities in other fields.
- That pattern also manifests with respect to national environmental administrations. See Germany: While the German environmental administration records very successful climate protection activities in Germany and Europe, the German car industry propagates and practically enforces an extremely polluting mobility style in China and other regions of the Earth (Asia, Latin Amerika, Middle East, parts of Africa). Is it not only the systematic usage of *steering technologies* to massively lower the registered pollution data in cars towards everyday pollution reality - it is above all the aggressive worldwide marketing of SUVs and other big cars by the German car industry that deeply changes the global environmental record of Germany.
- Emissions by transnational firms are usually attributed to the guest-lands of those firms. Hence the emission-record does not reflect the responsibility of the responsible actor (the enterprise) - a counterproductive procedure since then the most responsible actor (the firm) is not interested in reducing its emissions.
- More encompassing ways of registration such as the Global *Ecological Footprint* approach still have too little weight towards national approaches of registration.[6]

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[4] http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wissen/ozeane-die-weltmeere-ersticken-1.3392327
[5] Press information 036/2016 KIT: https://www.kit.edu/kit/pi_2016_036_oel-und-gas-boom-laesst-methan-ausstoss-ansteigen.php
[6] http://www.footprintnetwork.org/; https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Footprint_Network

1.3 Depth

The usual way of thinking about anthropogenic climate change implies an explanative model: Civilization-induced emissions turn into pollution load in the atmosphere, into global warming and its aftermaths on Earth - a causal chain model. That model can be widened by a similar chain model that reaches back from greenhouse gas emissions to the Earth population: Greenhouse gas emissions result from burning fossil energy sources - that are required for consumption, transports, and production - satisfying the population of a certain size…

The single stages of the resulting causal chain from Earth population to aftermaths of global warmth are not invariably fixed with each other; at any stage, rather, specific factors may intervene. See specific factors of economic development or technologies. Also natural events such as volcanic eruptions may influence chain relations. That's why the causal chain has to be considered loosely coupled - both limiting complexity and opening it up (see figure 1).

Figure 2: The loosely coupled *causal chain of anthropogenic climate change*

Climate policy can be modeled as an accordingly structured loosely coupled chain of steering options of more or less large depth (see figure 2):

**Figure 3: *Steering depth options of climate policy***

Sources: Own diagrams

These steering options follow each other logically, as represented in figure 2, from Earth-wide population control up to adaptation policies. At any stage, a bundle of specific factors can intervene.

The normative discussion on climate policy usually prefers policies of large depth such as the change to regenerative energy sources, efficiency-initiatives, limits to economic growth and global population growth; since policies of large depth reduce environmental loads in an encompassing way whereas activities at low steering depths manage only parts of the problem. The historical process of how environmental policy has developed, indeed, has run in quite another way: Modern environmental policy started in continental Europe with the development of technical environmental protection in the 1950s and 1960s. As to see until the end of the 1970s in the Ruhr-area, that orientation focused on measures with low steering depth such as the stimulation and enforcement of building higher chimneys (Hohe Schornsteine-Programm 1977).[7] Not before the 1980s measures of middle steering depth, particularly additive techniques of emission reduction like desulphurization-installments and fluidized-bed combustion, came about - a transmission to even bigger depth approaches such as regenerative energy sources since the early 1990s.

The start of global climate air policy exactly corresponded with that historical tendency: The option of anthropogenic climate change has already been discussed in the 19th century, and continuously increasing CO2-emissions have been known already since 1860.[8] Nevertheless climate policy (with its prevalence of large depth options) has become a dominant environmental policy issue not before the 1990s.

Figure 4: *Normative logic and historical development of climate policy (depths)*

In contrast to the normative logic of the steering depth model, environmental policy historically developed from low and middle steering depths to bigger depth options. Not before the 1990ies, an expert discussion on regenerative energy started, and only recently an international discussion on those political options has come up. This process appears to be not finished yet. Thus discussions on how models of development (including dynamics of economic consumption, traffic, production, and population) influence climate policy ends increasingly include also consumption styles and social patterns of reproduction.[9]

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[7] https://books.google.de/books?id=4uPDBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=Hohe+Schornsteine-Programm+NRW&source=bl&ots=Or4lkGbcFX&sig=bA8qD5FgFy1CRdSZjaBLu8RsF4c&hl=de&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi8n-ihzK7SAhVHXSwKHWY0COYQ6AEIJzAB#v=onepage&q=Hohe%20Schornsteine-Programm%20NRW&f=false

[8] http://www.volker-quaschning.de/datserv/CO2/index.php

[9] Although simple models of ecological balances may have phased out - see:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%96kologisches_Gleichgewicht

1.4 Velocity

Climate policy has to work fast enough to avoid a climate disaster. At it, the perceived time-pressure is even stronger the lower the acceptable rise of global temperature is fixed. Hence the transition from the 2°limit before the Paris Treaty to the 1.5°limit symbolizes a growing readiness to accept an increasing time-pressure in climate policy.

Systematically, environmental action velocity can be defined with respect to four different periods of time:

- The time period of building a political will
- The time period of decision-making
- The time period of implementation
- The time period of outcome

The shorter a period of time, the higher the corresponding velocity of action;

In tendency, policies of large depth need longer periods of time to be realized than policies of low depth. Independently from that relation, any environmental activity can be fastened or slowed down.

Active defense constitutes a situational type of particular significance in that respect: If that situational type is officially declared to exist, a government is entitled to enforce draconic measures not only of low depth, for instance an authoritative information of warning, but also authoritative measures of large depth, for instance a limit or even the stop of consumption, traffic, or production in an area. By that administrative political entitlement, measures can be realized relatively fast. At the other hand, measures of that type usually are only legitimated with low spatial and time scope.

1.5 Problem and policy profiles

By systematically combining the criterions of intensity, scope, depth and velocity, problem and policy profiles can be formed: a) Problem profiles encompass the elements of problem intensity, (spatial, time, and factual) problem scope, problem depth, and problem velocity. At it, problem depth and problem velocity often covariate negatively with each other: A symptom is already given (high problem velocity at extremely low depth) whereas a deep cause may produce an open problem only after a long time (low problem velocity at large problem depth). b) Policy profiles encompass the elements of steering intensity, steering scope (in terms of space, time, and substance), steering depth, and steering velocity. A steering profile is usually assessed in relation to the individual problem profile. Indeed, it can make sense to act anticipatory, for instance very intensely and broad although an open environmental problem is not immediately given.

Two cases may illustrate these ideas, 1) problem and policy profiles on the depleting of ozone layer, 2) problem and policy profiles (Germany) on climate change.

Table 1: *Problem and policy profiles/ozone depletion*

	Problem Profile	Steering Profile
Intensity	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Scope	xxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Depth	xxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Velocity	xxxxx	xxxxx

Source: Own assessment

Table 2: Problem and policy profiles/climate change 2016 (own assessments)

	Problem Profile	Steering Profile
Intensity	xxxxxxxxxxxxx	xxx
Scope	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	xxx
Depth	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxx
Velocity	xxxxx	xxxx

Source: Own assessment

The tables illustrate fundamental differences between the two cases:

1. Problem profiles: While the stratospheric ozone-layer problem (FCKW) was a focused production problem with a relative low spatial and factual scope, climate change is a universal problem deeply anchored in every-day-structures of consumption, traffic, and production.
2. Policy profiles: The ozone depletion policy of the 1980s operated with complete bans of whole product groups, that is, with very high intensity and scope; climate protection policies, in contrast, have so far reached limited intensity and scope.
3. While the steering profile of the ozone depletion case goes far beyond the corresponding problem profile, the climate protection profile by far does not reach the problem profile - expressing clear deficits of steering.

That's why it is no wonder that climate protection policy has - by far - not yet rendered sufficient steering effects (in contrast to the historic case of ozone depletion policy).

1.6 Insights and suggestions

What can we learn from the presented data, concepts, and typologies?

1) Environmental policy can be systematically structured and assessed.
2) Real processes may run differently and even reversely to programmatic ideas. Hence we have to study what factors influence concrete decisions and behavior. So far I can see capacities and individual interests are most crucial. That's why these variables should be focused.
3) Nevertheless normative ideas can be influential, too. Although long-term delays have occurred, a rational climate policy has come on the way step by step.
4) Sociopolitical processes often go on dynamically, whereby capacities of lower depth tend to open up capacities of greater depth, and so forth.
5) Also the present status of climate policy does not completely meet functional challenges; rather forms of large depth steering are becoming even more influential.

2. Socio-ecological structures in the global society

Emission rates and forms of environmental policy combine in different socio-ecological types: near-natural, over-usage of scarce resources, classical industrial society, modernized environmental policy, and *regaining ecological balance* (figure 3).

Figure 5: *Eco-social types*

- **Near-natural cultures** are characterized by low population, low consumption, low traffic, and low production rates and have not developed significant emission potentials. That's why they exhibit extremely low emission rates. Reflected environmental policy is no part of that culture; indeed, internalized responsibility is integral part of it.
- **Over-usage of scarce resources** relates to underdeveloped areas, where natural resources are over-used and extreme forms of pollution can happen (for instance by illegal deposition of toxic waste). The resulting (punctually very high) emission rate is associated with an extremely low degree of environmental responsibility because there are no capacities for building up such responsibility.
- **The classical industrial society** regularly exhibits very high emission rates. Environmental responsibility comes up only, if ever, related to technological approaches (from middle to low steering depths).
- **Modernized environmental policy** is based on high technological, economic, scientific, and political capacities. Accordingly the emission rate goes back compared to the emission rate of the classical industrial society. And the degree of environmental responsibility significantly increases. At the other hand, a modernizing environmental policy does not exclude innovations that produce new environmental loads - see for instance the increasing plastic wrapping of food.

- *Regaining ecological balance* stands for a highly reflected society that has learned to bind itself to ecological standards of high depth. That life-style uses environmentally sound materials, energy sources, and space resources in highly efficient ways; additionally it operates in balanced populations patterns.

These socio-ecological types constitute the global society by differentiation and reciprocal influences. At it, classical industrial societies and societies of modernized environmental policy prevail whereas regions with overused scarce resources and near-natural cultures are of marginal or no global influence.

Climate policy has to take these global structures into account - not only regarding differences of financial and technical capacities, but also regarding socio-ecological potentials; since otherwise those capacities would be disregarded or even destroyed. Thus near-natural structures (such as the pole-caps, the deep sea, and rain forests) have to be protected with high priority; otherwise a resource demanding developmental dynamic would come on the way. It should also be avoided to transform structures of over-used scarce resources to classical industrial structures; since then an enduring maximum of greenhouse gas emissions would be induced. Instead, ways of more direct ecological innovation should be studied. In short, effective climate policy has to operate with sufficient intensity, scope, depth, and velocity - according to given context-conditions.

3. The framing of multi-level citizenship and its counter-framing

Climate policy analysis presupposes a certain framing: The whole Earth-human system, particularly the generations to come, are in jeopardy through a too fast and too intense climate change. Vice versa, any human being contributes directly or indirectly to climate change and is responsible for meeting the challenge. Insofar everybody is an Earth Citizen.

Since global responsibility can be practically implemented only at lower levels (international, supranational, national, regional, local, private), citizenship operates at multi levels. If somebody thinks and feels this world only in terms of one level such as the national one, he/she cannot understand the discussion on climate policy. Without a multi-level framing, efforts and processes of climate policy seem to be useless, wrong, or even harmful.

An even more comprehensive political framing relates to **multi-dimensionality**:

- Climate policy operates in policy terms. All corresponding criterions (such as steering intensity, scope, depth, and velocity) constitute a political dimension of its own, the policy dimension.
- Policy thinking, indeed, can only come up when the involved actors are effectively protected against encroachments; hence the policy dimension practically presupposes an independent dimension of reciprocal respect, in other words, effective binding to generally accepted norms (*bound governance*).
- The interaction about interests and influence (politics dimension) is relativized by bound governance and policy debates of their own - a fundamental difference to a cone-dimensional constellation of pure power.

Table 2: *Framings of coordination*

Dimensions	One-dimensional Power Politics	Two-dimensional Bound Governance	Three-dimensional Public Policy
Interaction (Politics)	⬛	🟥	🟥
Independent rules (Polity)		🟨	🟨
Substantial Responsibility (Public Policy)			🟩

Source: Own chart

Table 2 shows one-dimensional, two-dimensional, and three-dimensional framings of coordination:

- One-dimensional coordination operates only in terms of power. Hence the individually stronger actor can realize his or her will also against resistance. The weaker one, on his part, has to submit oneself, at least to adapt or to flee; otherwise he or she is in acute danger to be harmed or even killed.
- Two-dimensional coordination operates in two separated dimensions: a dimension of independent rules (rule of law) and the operative dimension (of playing a game). That way of coordination implies civility because the involved actors have to respect each other according to jointly accepted - and hence binding - norms (*bound governance*).
- Three-dimensional coordination, finally, joins political interaction (politics) and bound governance structures (rule of law) with substantial responsibility in the public interest. Here substantial discourses about how to act best in the public interest take place and become significant for the results of coordination. Hence substantial challenges and capacities to meet them significantly influence the perception of coordination and its institutions.

Citizenship comes about by structurally combining bound governance and public policy: Based on reciprocal respect and bound to jointly accepted norms, citizens feel equal and free. As economic citizen, cultural citizen and so forth they take part in rule-bound operative systems, but they are principally also ready for participating in activities on the rule level such as in political elections. Last but not least they deal with substantial challenges of society (Political citizen/State citizen).

Climate policy requires multi-level citizenship under both aspects: bound governance and openness for a substantial discourse on diverse levels up to the global level (multi-level citizenship). Beyond, it also strengthens those framings by intensely using and symbolizes them. Hence actors that think one-dimensionally and at one spatial level (such as at the national level only) consider climate policy to be rubbish or even to be detrimental. That's why a fundamental political clash between right-wing extremists, mostly nationalists, and the adherents and representatives of the open society comes up - wherein climate policy is in the focus.

In this political-cultural clash, objectively provable facts do not play a role as such; the dispute, rather, is only about who is able to prevail - a transition to a one-dimensional power-oriented process. Here the extremist forces feel being at war against their political enemies. Hence they fight not only against parliamentarian adversaries, but against the complete institutions of free press and free science, particularly against free research on climate policy.[10] Stephen Bannon, Trump's mastermind, explicitly talks about the deconstruction of the given state.[11] Hence the framing clash on climate policy (research) represents a comprehensive clash about basic institutions and cultural achievements of the open society.

4. Evolution and devolution of multi-level citizenship

4.1 How does multi-level citizenship develop (Evolution)?

Multi-level citizenship has two pillars, bound governance (civility) and public policy (responsibility). Hence we have to explain how these two pillars come into existence.

A basic resource of bound governance (civility) is widening integration (socialization), particularly resulting from widening commerce, travels, and communication. Systems tend to integrate more and more individuals and social entities as long that process generates perceivable public benefits. Thus **chains of interdependency grow** - a rational impulse for building reciprocal attitudes such as reciprocal respect (*civility*) and jointly accepted norms of equality (b*ound governance*).[12] In that process, anomic structures of isolation or war as well as one-dimensional power structures turn into two-dimensional structures of both an independent rule dimension and an independent operative dimension. That transition from a one-dimensional framing in terms of power to a two-dimensional framing in terms of independent rule and operative behavior constitutes a fundamental step to civil modernity. The resulting reciprocal attitudes and equal institutionalization, at their part, symbolize and strengthen the process of civilization.

Widening attitudes and structures of bound governance can be managed best by a twofold differentiation:

1. Functional subsystems, i.e. substance-related forms of bound governance, differentiate.[13]
2. Spatial levels of managing coordination (local, regional, national, supranational, global) differentiate.

Hence widening integration and bound governance imply both forms of differentiation - resulting in structures of modern states and society.

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[10] See: Ideology against science: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wissen/proteste-in-boston-us-wissenschaftler-wagen-den-aufstand-gegen-trump-1.3386855-3

[11] http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/stephen-bannon-rueckbau-des-staates-ist-wichtigstes-ziel-a-1136078.html

[12] An explanation that has been offered already by Norbert Elias in his book *The process of civilization* Norbert Elias 1936/1978: Über den Prozess der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen, 1. Band: Wandlungen des Verhaltens in den weltlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes, 6. Aufl., Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp.

[13] Niklas Luhmann 1984: Soziale Systeme, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp; idem: 1997: Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

A supplementing theory on how bound governance structures have historically arisen has been presented by the cultural historian Johan Huizinga (1938): He considers the building and spreading of games to be a fundamental element of cultural development. Since playing a game is structured according to bound governance principles (differentiation of rule dimension and operative dimension), modern civility develops with the playing human (*Homo ludens*).[14]

Extending integration and bound governance imply the developing of increasing economic, technical, and socio-political capacities. These capacities, at their part, enable to be aware of substantial challenges - the basis of an independent policy-dimension.[15]

4.2 Devolution: Under which conditions does multi-level citizenship go down?

Conversely to the outlined concept of evolution, some laterally reversed conclusions can be drawn on why multi-lateral citizenship may go down (*devolution*). Thus, structural disintegration, for instance produced by racism and religious hate, is a steady source of possible devolution. If a party or even a government prefers a course of economic disintegration, for instance by limiting market scopes and withdrawals from integration, principles of bound governance and public policy respectively multi-level citizenship go down.

But why can a counter-framing against values and institutions of citizenship become influential although attitudes and institutions of an open society are evolved and formally ruling? I see three main elements of explanation:

1) **Inconsequential ways of governing**: (Multi-level) citizenship is massively weakened if a government does not avoid that structures of bound governance are regularly circumvented and undermined - such as by the power of economic, religious, estates-based, or socio-political organizations, by lobbyism or corruption. See - as a wide-spread example for that inconsequential way of governance - regular deals between mighty actors, prosecution, and judges in striking contrast to how normal culprits are treated in court. If government does not thwart or even counteract those practices, it does not meet its function to protect civility and citizenship.

2) **Deficits of clarity and education**: Multi-level and multi-dimensional patterns of coordination can be effective only if they are based on a broad fundament of consent and understanding. That's why a dangerous split because elites and parts of the people can arise if corresponding tasks of political socialization and education are not sufficiently fulfilled. Once political representatives of devolution have come to influential positions in public or even in government, the situation gets even worse: Then a fundamental battle about citizenship arises - with a distinct risk of external or even internal war.

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[14] Johan Huizinga 1938: Homo ludens; Johan Huizinga (Author), Andreas Flitner (Ed.): *Homo ludens. Vom Ursprung der Kultur im Spiel*. Reinbek 2009

[15] The core content of the capacity theory: According to this theory, any (functional) system publicly issues only problems it is able to cope with; since if it reacts in a way that it is not able to do successfully, it would gravely get worse. Hence an independent policy dimension can only differentiate based on a high standard of given capacities to meet substantial challenges. (Volker von Prittwitz 1990: Das Katastrophenparadox. Elemente einer Theorie der Umweltpolitik, Opladen: Leske+Budrich, in particular: pp. 13-27; 103 - 112; 202-208; idem 2011: Katastrophenparadox und Kapazitätstheorie: file:///C:/Users/samsung/Documents/kapazit%C3%A4tstheorie.htm

3) **Conceptual governance deficits**: Current governance is usually proclaimed to be an exertion of law and justice; indeed inefficiency, inequity, and injustice are no rare exception, in the contrary: Particularly in economically weak countries, many people suffer from joblessness or market structures that do not allow them to live in a decent way - expression of far-reaching conceptual deficits of governance. Thus the prevailing national economy obviously do not renders satisfying concepts to cope with challenges of multi-level economy - for instance regarding relations between national and global economy as well as national and local economy.

Inconsequential ways of governing, deficits of clarity and education, and the aftermaths of conceptual governance deficits can influence each other reciprocally to bring down the civil order - up to distinct risks of demise and war. Currently we are experiencing a cultural and political battle about multi-level citizenship with climate policy as an outstanding issue-area.

5. Research program

Coming from the presented concepts, typologies, models, and explanative hypotheses, the following research program opens up.

5.1 Comparative profiling of climate policy

Emission and policy profiles of climate policy can be ascertained for

a) selected countries,
b) selected socio-ecological types,
c) global average

Relations between specific criterions (intensity, scope, depth, velocity) are of special interest as basis of advanced policy analysis and policy consulting.

5.2 Climate policy scenarios

Based on 5.1, scenarios on how diverse strategic options of climate policy will work can be developed. Are there characteristic paths of modernization regarding problem and policy profiles? Are there realistic options of directly passing from over-used scarce resources to regaining ecological balance?

5.3 Analyzing multi-level versus one-level (nationalist) forms of framing

One-level and multi-level framing processes of climate policy should be comparatively analyzed. In doing so, single framing levels such as private, local, regional, national, international, supranational, and global levels should be substantially investigated and compared.

5.4 Scrutinize the thesis of multidimensionality

- Does effective climate policy presuppose reciprocal respect of the involved actors or even jointly accepted norms? Are protected human rights a precondition of effective climate policy? Or are there practicable policy models to operate without human rights?

- Are symbols of climate policy (such as ice-bears, vanishing glaciers, or bleaching coral reefs) multi-dimensionally structured? If they do, how is their structure and how to study multi-dimensional designs best?

5.5 Comparative analysis of policy fields

Climate policy is regarded as an outstanding policy field of civil modernity (multi-level citizenship). Why has it got that image? Are there similar issue-areas or even certain issue-areas that actually surmount climate policy as a symbol of multi-level citizenship? The relations between climate policy and other policy fields should be empirically scrutinized within and beyond socio-ecological formations.

5.6 Why do framings of multi-level citizenship rise or fall? A process analysis

In the paper some hypotheses on evolution and devolution of multi-level citizenship have been presented. These hypotheses - and may be some others - should be empirically checked in order to understand the rising and falling of one-dimensional versus multidimensional framings of climate policy. In doing so, a more comprehensive process (including situational framings, events, and processual dynamics) analysis is to be developed.

5.7 Division of labor and research cooperation: Advanced research

Climate policy research generally requires both division of labor and cooperation. Based on the presented ideas and facts on multi-level citizenship, both demands intensify and develop: Climate research can be specifically advanced, for instance by systematic problem and policy profiles based on policy criterions such as intensity, scope, depth, and velocity. At the other hand new options of interdisciplinary cooperation arise such as cooperation between Political Scientists, Sociologists, Communication Science, and Psychology.

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